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PRODIGAL REASONING: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND 
THE NEED FOR A RETURN TO ANALYSIS 
Benjamin White* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The federal Constitution groans under the exegesis and eisegesis of its 
countless expositors, but a second constitution, often overlooked, also 
orders the lives of most Americans. State citizens enjoy the additional 
protection of their state constitution, which applies with a force equal to 
the federal Constitution.1 When the Nation’s founders “split the atom of 
autonomy,” they situated American citizens within two political 
realities: “one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by 
the other.”2 Not only may state constitutions confer rights with no 
federal corollary (for instance, the right to a remedy for injuries done to 
a person’s land, goods, person, or reputation3) but state supreme courts 
may also construe similar constitutional protections—such as the free 
exercise of religion versus an unhindered right of the conscience4—as 
having a substantive difference. 
The United States Supreme Court consistently acknowledges states’ 
abilities to adopt more expansive liberties in their constitutions than 
exist in the federal Constitution.5 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 
recognized the legitimacy of what is sometimes called Judicial 
Federalism, or New Federalism—the proposition that the rulings of the 
United States Supreme Court “are not, and should not be, dispositive of 
questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state 
law.”6 Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton has coined the expression “imperfect 
solutions” to positively refer to states’ constitutional alternatives to 
precedent based on the federal Constitution.7 He argues that state 
constitutional law would benefit from greater independence from United 
 
* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review. Thank you to Professor 
Marianna Bettman and Judge Jeffrey Sutton for reviewing this article. Very special thanks to Professor 
Michael Solimine for his perceptive feedback and continuing conversation. 
 1. Sanford Levinson, America’s “Other Constitutions”: The Importance of State Constitutions 
for Our Law and Politics, 45 TULSA L. REV. 813, 813 (2009). 
 2. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995).  
 3. OHIO CONST. art I, § 16 
 4. Id. art. I, § 7; Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (2000). 
 5. E.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). 
 6. William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 489, 502 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan]. 
 7. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach—and Why Study—State Constitutional Law, 34 OKLA. CITY U. 
L. REV. 165, 175 (2009) [hereinafter Sutton, State Constitutional Law]; JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 
IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS 19 (2018) [hereinafter SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS]. 
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States Supreme Court jurisprudence. Confronted with difficult and 
divisive constitutional issues, “it may be more appropriate to have fifty-
one imperfect solutions rather than one imperfect solution.”8 
These jurists recognize that the federal Constitution is not the 
fountainhead of all constitutional guarantees.9 The contrary is often true. 
In crafting the federal Bill of Rights, the drafters drew from state 
constitutions.10 Each of the protections enumerated in the federal Bill of 
Rights had a prior correspondent in one or more state constitutions.11  
Despite the reality that a state constitution is “a document of 
independent force,”12 the Supreme Court of Ohio has a strained 
association with Judicial Federalism. Ohio’s high court first embraced 
Judicial Federalism in 1993 with Arnold v. City of Cleveland,13 a 
decision interpreting Ohio’s constitutional gun rights provision based on 
its historical basis and textual difference from the federal Second 
Amendment. The Ohio Supreme Court has also departed from the 
United States Supreme Court on free exercise,14 eminent domain,15 and 
certain warrantless arrests,16 to name a few. But these are some rare 
exceptions.17 The Court often locksteps with the United States Supreme 
Court.18 As a matter of policy, there is nothing wrong with this. But 
alarmingly, principled reasoning has, like a prodigal, departed some of 
the Court’s opinions that break from the lockstep—resulting in decisions 
that purport to enlarge rights under the Ohio Constitution but waste an 
opportunity to give good reasons why.19 Consequently, these decisions 
reflect unpredictability in Ohio constitutional law, rather than a 
commitment to basic principles of constitutional interpretation. 
Section II lays out the background of Judicial Federalism, including 
 
 8. Sutton, State Constitutional Law, supra note 7, at 175. 
 9. Brennan, supra note 6, at 501. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 13. Id.; see also State v. Mole, 149 Ohio St.3d 215, 2016-Ohio-5124, 74 N.E.3d 368,  ¶ 15. 
 14. Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (2000). 
 15. Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115. 
 16. State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 323, 2003-Ohio-3931, 792 N.E.2d 175, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
 17. For other instances when the court has held that the Ohio constitution affords greater 
protection than its federal counterpart, see Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger’s concurrence in Simpkins v. 
Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio, 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122, ¶ 61. 
 18. E.g., Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 
55, 60, 717 N.E.2d 286 (1999) (We affirm, therefore, that the federal and Ohio Equal Protection Clauses 
are to be construed and analyzed identically.”) 
 19. E.g., State v. Mole, 149 Ohio St.3d 215, 2016-Ohio-5124, 74 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 78 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing a lead opinion which lacked the “careful analysis set forth in the Arnold opinion 
to justify [their] conclusion[s] that the Ohio Constitution affords greater protection”); see also State v. 
Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 463, 2016-Ohio-8278, 83 N.E.3d 862. 
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exemplary state supreme court decisions that model sound legal 
analysis. Section III examines Ohio’s tradition of Judicial Federalism 
and recent illustrative cases. Section IV argues that the Ohio Supreme 
Court should return to and reinforce its tradition of resorting to simple 
standards when determining whether the Ohio Constitution offers 
Ohioans greater protection than the federal Constitution. 
II.  THE RISE OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
A.  Relationship Between State Supreme Courts and the United States 
Supreme Court  
As early as 1874, the United States Supreme Court in Murdock v. City 
of Memphis acknowledged the fitness of state courts to adjudicate 
individuals’ federal rights.20 Facing the contention that certain rights 
cannot be wholly protected without Supreme Court review, Justice 
Miller wrote that eighty-five years of living “under the opposite theory” 
contradicted that argument.21 The Court understood as axiomatic that 
state courts do not disregard or resist the influence of clear federal law.22 
Even more obvious was the Court’s authority to resolve dispositive 
federal questions.23 Therefore, matters “not of a Federal character”—
that is, matters arising under a state constitution, statute, or common 
law—could not be said to necessitate Supreme Court review.24 
Often, however, state courts are deciding issues that involve both 
state and federal constitutions.25 As it remains “emphatically the 
province and duty” of the federal judiciary to expound the federal 
Constitution,26 when the record does not clearly reveal that a state court 
based its decision on its state constitution rather than the federal 
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court may “take steps to 
protect [its] jurisdiction when [it is] given reasonable grounds to believe 
it exists.”27 In Herb v. Pitcairn, Justice Jackson observed that the 
Court’s review only applies to the incorrect adjudication of federal 
 
 20. 87 U.S. 590 (1874). 
 21. Id. at 632. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 632-33. 
 25. RANDY J. HOLLAND, STEPHEN R. MCALLISTER, JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE MODERN EXPERIENCE 166 (1st ed. 2010). 
 26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 27. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945). See also Murdock, 87 U.S. at 632 (“when the 
Supreme Court is of opinion that the question of Federal law is of such relative importance to the whole 
case that it should control the final judgment, that court is authorized to render such judgment and 
enforce it by its own process.”). 
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rights.28 Revision of an incorrect, but non-dispositive, federal issue 
would amount to an impermissible advisory opinion.29 Thus, to signal to 
the United States Supreme Court that their review is unnecessary, state 
courts need to show that their decisions are grounded in an “adequate” 
and “independent” state basis.30 
Justice Jackson’s concerns in Herb found fuller expression in 
Michigan v. Long.31 Writing for the Long majority, Justice O’Connor 
cited respect for state court independence and the need to avoid advisory 
opinions as the mainsprings for the Court’s abstention from review 
when faced with “an adequate and independent state ground.”32 When 
the face of a state court decision rests on or is interwoven with federal 
law, bearing no marks of reliance on any state grounds, the Supreme 
Court will presume that the decision reflects the state court’s best effort 
at resolving the federal issue.33 Such an opinion is not immune from 
Supreme Court review. The now-familiar rule holds that “[i]f the state 
court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively 
based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent state grounds, 
we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.”34 
Long has been criticized for reversing a tradition of presuming the 
non-reviewability of state court cases, establishing instead a 
presumption of Supreme Court jurisdiction.35 On its own terms, 
however, Long sought to resolve the problem of ad hoc review of state 
court decisions and state law.36 Existing principles had not availed the 
Court in resolving the “vexing issue” of ascertaining whether a state 
court’s non-federal basis provided independent and adequate support for 
its judgment.37 First, the Supreme Court’s own review of state law 
forced the justices to interpret laws with which they were unfamiliar and 
 
 28. Herb, 324 U.S. at 125-26. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 125. 
 31. 463 U.S. 1032. 
 32. Id. at 1040. 
 33. Id. at 1040-41. A state court may rely on federal precedents for guidance, but should plainly 
state that its use of the federal cases was only for guidance, and that they did not compel the court’s 
decision. 
 34. Id. at 1041. 
 35. See Carol Anne Kann, Supreme Court Review of State Court Cases: Principled Federalism 
or Selective Bias? 36 EMORY L.J. 1277, 1279 (1987) [hereinafter Kann]. 
 36. Long, 463 U.S. at 1039. 
 37. Id. at 1038 (quoting Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 773 (1931)). Among the 
Court’s guiding principles: dismissing the case outright when the decisional grounds were unclear; 
vacating or continuing to clarify the nature of the state court’s judgment; and undertaking a review of 
state law to determine if the state court had used federal law to guide its application of state law. None 
of these approaches consistently preserved the relationships between federal and state governments. Id. 
at 1038-39. 
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which the parties rarely briefed in great detail.38 Second, vacating the 
lower decision and continuing the case for clarification was inefficient 
and time-consuming. This approach also burdened the state courts to 
demonstrate whether or not the Supreme Court had jurisdiction.39 Third, 
the need for uniformity in federal law rendered outright dismissal 
counterproductive, because in doing so the Court foreclosed review of 
decisions founded on primarily federal grounds, thus forfeiting 
opportunities to refine the federal law on particular issues.40 When “the 
four corners of the opinion” do not reveal a state court’s reliance on a 
state ground, the state court has potentially compromised a federal issue, 
undermining federal uniformity.41  
But uniformity is a contested virtue in a federalist government. As a 
matter of federalism, “we expect and comfortably tolerate” non-uniform 
substantive law from state to state.42 Each state has authority 
independent from the others and from the central government; 
legislative diversity is inevitable.43 Quite the contrary from being a thorn 
in the nation’s side, this diversity is “one of the happy incidents” of 
federalism.44 States can and do serve as laboratories, experimenting with 
new policies that pose no risk to the rest of the country.45 Professor 
Lawrence Sager, for one, would not prevent “those state courts which 
are prepared to enlarge upon the enforcement of underenforced 
constitutional norms from doing so.”46 The Supreme Court, however, 
has jealously guarded its role as the final arbiter of the meaning of the 
U.S. Constitution.47 The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court 
the authority to review losing claims in state courts when state action 
was alleged to violate the federal Constitution.48 The Court could not 
review prevailing federal claims of unconstitutionality until 1914.49 The 
Court now exercises that authority through 28 U.S.C. § 1257.50 
California v. Green showed that the Supreme Court is not reluctant to 
rein in a state supreme court’s expansion of a Bill of Rights Provision.51 
 
 38. Id. at 1039. 
 39. Id. at 1039-40. 
 40. Id. at 1040. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1251 (1978) [hereinafter Sager]. 
 43. Id. 
 44. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Sager, supra note 42, at 1253.  
 47. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
 48. Sager, supra note 42, at 1242-43. 
 49. Id. 
 50. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). 
 51. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
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The California Supreme Court held that a belated cross-examination on 
a witness’s out of court statements violates the Confrontation Clause.52 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the state supreme court. By 
its lights, the Confrontation Clause was not offended as long as the 
declarant could later be required to explain inconsistences between his 
former and current testimonies.53 When full cross-examination remains 
possible, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.54 Thus, the Supreme 
Court flexed its arms on this federal issue and took advantage of its right 
to give construction to the federal constitutional provision. Green was 
the first time the United States Supreme Court reversed a state court’s 
expansion on a Bill of Rights protection.55 
Green represents an issue related to Professor Sager’s criticism of 
Supreme Court review (and reversal) of state court expansions on 
federal guarantees. Professor Sager has argued that it is inappropriate for 
the Supreme Court to review state court decisions that enforce 
constitutional rights no further than the margin of that federal 
constitutional guarantee.56 The Supreme Court has not shared Professor 
Sager’s favorable perspective on parity. When Ohio v. Robinette was 
first brought before the Ohio Supreme Court (Robinette I),57 Justice 
Pfeifer, writing for a 4-3 majority, attempted to establish a bright-line 
rule about consensual interrogations with police officers. The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I 
of the Ohio Constitution share similar wording.58 Robinette I held that 
any police attempt attempting to initiate a consensual interrogation must 
first advise the civilian, “At this time you legally are free to go,” or 
words to that effect.59 Unfortunately for the defendant, the Ohio 
Supreme Court based its ruling expressly under the federal and state 
 
 52. Id. at 153. 
 53. Id. at 164.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Kann, supra note 35, at 1278. 
 56. Sager, supra note 42, at 1248 (“If an underenforced constitutional norm is valid to its 
conceptual boundaries, the decision of the state court can be understood as the enforcement of the 
unenforced margin of a constitutional norm, that is, as the assumption of an important constitutional role 
which the federal courts perceive themselves constrained to avoid because of institutional concerns.”). 
 57. 653 N.E.2d 695 (1995) (“Robinette I”). 
 58. Compare OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person and things to be seized.”) with U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.”). 
 59. Robinette I, 653 N.E.2d at 655.  
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constitutions, bringing the decision squarely in Long’s crosshairs.60 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court, 
noting that the proper federal test depends on reasonableness, not a 
bright-line rule.61 Justice Ginsburg concurred, suspecting that the Ohio 
Supreme Court did not actually believe its bright-line rule would apply 
to the entire country.62 She recognized Ohio’s courts occupied a “unique 
vantage point,” having observed that traffic stops throughout Ohio had 
routinely led to contraband searches where the officers had no 
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.63 Subtle though it may be, 
Justice Ginsburg’s observation highlights an important capacity of 
Judicial Federalism: the value of state judges’ familiarity with local and 
regional dynamics when construing constitutional rights as they apply to 
the state’s own citizens. 
B. State Supreme Court Vanguards 
1.  State Court Responses to Federal Doctrines 
There are various approaches to state court adoption of federal 
constitutional doctrine.64 State courts may “unreflectively” adopt the 
constitutional boundaries drawn by the United States Supreme Court, 
applying those boundaries to state constitutional rights.65 Alternatively, 
state courts may adopt federal analysis in interpreting their own 
constitutions on a case-by-case basis.66  “Prospective lockstepping” 
occurs when the state court applies federal analysis not only for the case 
at bar, but for all future matters involving the same constitutional 
guarantee.67 State courts may also prospectively adopt a United States 
Supreme Court’s test or standard used in a given constitutional 
doctrine.68  It is worth noting that most state courts, on most issues, walk 
in lockstep with federal courts.69 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996) (“Robinette II”). 
 62. Id. at 42. 
 63. Id. at 40.  
 64. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 193-209 (2009) 
[hereinafter WILLIAMS]. 
 65. Id. at 196-97. 
 66. Id. at 197-200. 
 67. Id. at 200-05.  
 68. Id. at 205-07. This approach is not as strict as prospective lockstepping, because the court 
adopts a federal method as opposed to a bright line rule. “The state court’s actual decision or outcome in 
a specific case, in other words, might not in all cases conform to federal precedents.” Id. at 205. 
 69. Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First 
Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 338 (2002). 
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From a posture of unreflective adoption, state courts apply “federal 
analysis to a state clause without acknowledging the possibility of a 
different outcome.”70 This approach may be at the expense of more 
protective guarantees under the state constitution.71 Justice Hans Linde 
of the Oregon Supreme Court has criticized the dearth of analysis that 
accompanies some state court adoption of federal constitutional 
interpretations.72 In State v. Kennedy, after the United States Supreme 
Court had already reversed the Oregon Court of Appeals, Justice Linde 
addressed the argument that when a state constitution’s provisions are 
“substantially identical” to the federal or other state constitutions, then 
the presumption follows that the state constitutional framers shared the 
same objectives as the framers of those constitutions.73 He permitted that 
this may be so, but recognized that discovering constitutional objectives 
is different from discovering the correct application of constitutional 
meaning.74 The framers of the Oregon Constitution may have shared the 
same goal in forbidding Double Jeopardy as the framers of the United 
States Constitution; but there is no straight line leading to the conclusion 
that the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of the federal 
Double Jeopardy clause “presumptively fix its correct meaning also in 
state constitutions.”75 
Professor Laurence Tribe has expressed similar concerns in the 
federal context. When Arkansas public schools refused to desegregate 
after Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court in Cooper v. 
Aaron reiterated Marbury v. Madison’s basic lesson that federal 
explication of the United States Constitution, and therefore the 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown, was the 
“supreme law of the land.”76 Tribe identifies two possible assumptions 
inscribed in that pronouncement. First, a Supreme Court constitutional 
decision effectively “announces a general norm of wide applicability.”77 
This reading aggrandizes Supreme Court power over parties not 
appearing before it, but is justified by the great importance of equality.78 
The second, more odious interpretation of Cooper’s pronouncement is 
that “the Constitution is what the Court says it is, and no more.”79 If 
 
 70. WILLIAMS at 197. 
 71. See id.  
 72. State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983). 
 73. Id. at 1322. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).  
 77. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33-34 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter 
TRIBE]. 
 78. Id. at 34. 
 79. Id. 
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true, then constitutional meaning does not invite “legitimate dispute” 
when the Court has rendered a decision.80 But this view “ignores the 
reality that . . . the Court is not alone is its responsibility to address that 
meaning.”81 Among the parties responsible for construing constitutional 
meaning, Tribe states, are state courts.82 These criticisms highlight the 
importance of independent analysis from state courts.  
2.  Constitutional Guarantees Unique to the State 
Justice Linde’s analysis in Sterling v. Cupp is significant for its 
textual and historical depth, but also for his guidance on the proper 
sequence of state court adjudication of multiple claims when they 
include both state and federal issues.83 In Sterling, male prisoners 
brought claims arising under both the Oregon and the United States 
Constitutions, complaining of offensive touching and observation by 
female security guards.84 Justice Linde announced that state law analysis 
should precede federal analysis.85 This makes sense: assuming state law 
applies at all, it does not deny any right flowing from the federal 
Constitution.86 A valid state constitutional guarantee will go no lower 
than the floor of the federal Constitution. Justice Linde cited his opinion 
in State v. Scharf as support.87 In Scharf, the defendant had been denied 
the right to counsel after being arrested for driving under the influence 
of alcohol.88 Justice Linde indicated the state constitutional provisions 
may extend further than their federal analogues.89 The state guarantee 
can provide the protection sought and still harmonize with Fourteenth 
Amendment due process.90 And yet, although the United States 
Constitution only limits state officials, the mere absence of contrary 
state law does not necessarily authorize state action.91 State law must 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 75. Tribe’s discussion deals facially with federal constitutional meaning, but his 
concerns with Supreme Court preemption of alternative yet legitimate views relates directly to the 
matter at hand.  
 83. 625 P.2d 123 (1981). 
 84. Id. at 125. 
 85. Id. at 126. 
 86. Id. “The proper sequence is to analyze the state’s law, including its constitutional law, before 
reaching a federal constitutional claim. This is required, not for the sake either of parochialism or of 
style, but because the state does not deny any right claimed under the federal Constitution when the 
claim before the court in fact is fully met by state law.” 
 87. Id., fn. 2; State v. Scharf, 605 P.2d 690 (1980) (overruled on other grounds). 
 88. Scharf, 605 P.2d at 691. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
9
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affirmatively grant state officials the power to execute certain 
procedures.92 
Application of the “state-issue first” principle in Sterling did not 
prevent Linde from critiquing the vague contours of the right to privacy 
first conjured in Griswold v. Connecticut.93 The prisoners had claimed 
that the prison’s policy of permitting female security guards to frisk 
male prisoners and observe them while using the toilet or shower 
violated their (federal) right to privacy and numerous guarantees 
provided by the Oregon Constitution.94 Justice Linde characterized the 
right to privacy as “protean and emotive,” quoting Professor Tribe in 
stating, “[a] concept in danger of embracing everything is a concept in 
danger of conveying nothing.”95 Federal litigants had seized upon the 
expansive reach of the federal right, such that Linde suspected that the 
prisoners had raised it in state court out of habit.96 As asserted by 
prisoners, however, the right to privacy faced the disadvantage of a 
federal Constitution with relatively modest penal restrictions, limited to 
bills of attainder and cruel and unusual punishment.97  
By contrast, state constitutions “often contain clauses expressly 
directed toward guaranteeing humane treatment of those prosecuted for 
crime.”98 Here is an important point on advocacy. As Judge Sutton has 
written, sometimes “the only way a lawyer can win is through the state 
constitution because it is the only constitution with a provision on 
point.”99 The Oregon Constitution, for its part, guaranteed protections 
which had no federal corollary. For instance, it provided that the 
purpose of punishment shall be for reformation, not retribution, and 
shall not affect persons or estates beyond that of the convicted 
individual.100 Most important for the prisoners’ claim was the provision 
that “[n]o person arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated with 
unnecessary rigor.”101  
Justice Linde traced the history of the Oregon Constitution’s 
provisions back to New Hampshire’s 1783 constitution.102 Ohio and 
Indiana borrowed similar provisions, and the “unnecessary rigor” 
 
 92. Id.  
 93. Sterling, 625 P.2d at 126 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 
 94. Id. at 127. 
 95. Id. at 127 (quoting TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 888-889 (1976)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  
 99. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 7, at 19. 
 100. Sterling, 625 P.2d at 127. 
 101. OR. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 102. Sterling, 625 P.2d at 128. 
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guarantee appeared in Tennessee’s constitution in 1796.103 
Acknowledging that texts differ, Justice Linde observed that some state 
constitutional conventions considered humane penal principles 
important enough to constitutionalize, even if James Madison did not 
engrave them into the Bill or Rights or if Congress has not amended the 
federal Constitution.104 In this tradition, the Oregon Constitution 
mandated protections for which the United States Constitution—or cases 
interpreting it, for that matter—had no analogue.105 
Oregon’s constitutional guarantee against treating inmates with 
unnecessary rigor proved to be “a more cogent premise” than the federal 
right to privacy.106 First, the source of the right was unquestionable. 
Whereas a “right to privacy” is an interpretative but not textual federal 
right, the right against “unnecessary rigor” was “expressly included in 
the political act of adopting a constitution.”107 Justice Linde thus 
attached importance not only to the explicitness of the constitutional 
right, but also the revealed political will of Oregonians. Second, 
protection against “unnecessary rigor” was textually germane to the 
claim at issue. The same could not be said of the “right to privacy,” 
especially faced with the circumstance that rights of privacy are subject 
to forfeit after a criminal conviction.108 The federal claim, in other 
words, offered protection less consistent and less focused than the state 
claim, which was drafted to apply to the very circumstances alleged by 
the prisoners.109 Third, privacy is an elastic concept, waxing or waning 
in potency depending on the public policies at play.110 In a prison 
context, the public policies often cut in the prison’s favor. By contrast, 
the state claim scrutinizes state action by a necessity test and expressly 
applies to prisons.111  
Justice Linde’s demonstration of the state claim’s superiority showed 
more than just the advantage of analyzing state claims before federal 
claims; he also showed state constitutional claims often include greater 
protection than federal constitutional claims. 
 
 103. Id., fn. 11. 
 104. Id. at 129. 
 105. Id. at 128 (“The Oregon Constitution long has included in its Bill of Rights, besides the 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, no less than five such provisions that have no federal 
parallel.”). 
 106. Id. at 129. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Sterling, 625 P.2d at 129. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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3.  Parallel Guarantees, Different Results 
Sterling displayed how a state supreme court may proceed when a 
litigant presents both state and federal claims. Another issue is how a 
state supreme court chooses to interpret state constitutional provisions 
when they parallel a federal right. In Commonwealth v. Edmunds, the 
question before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to the Pennsylvania 
Constitution’s similarly-worded guarantee against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Pennsylvania’s highest court decided that the 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was not part of the 
Commonwealth’s jurisprudence under Article 1, Section 8 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.112 In so holding, the court flatly rejected the 
federal doctrine handed down by the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Leon, which held that the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States does not require the “extreme 
sanction” of excluding evidence when the officer acted in good faith 
reliance on an unconstitutional warrant.113 Edmunds is significant not 
just for rendering a rule contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, but simultaneously establishing “a methodology to be 
followed in analyzing future state constitutional issues which arise under 
own Constitution.”114 Justice Ralph Cappy modeled a principled 
hermeneutic in reaching that result. 
First, Justice Cappy discussed the federal case itself. Historical 
analysis revealed that Leon departed from a tradition of excluding 
unconstitutionally-seized evidence.115 The exclusionary rule was a 
judicial remedy to violations of the Fourth Amendment and had its basis 
in deterring unconstitutional police activity.116 Leon reasoned that 
excluding evidence acquired pursuant to an officer’s good faith reliance 
on an improper warrant deprives the prosecution from the use of that 
evidence without correcting undesirable police behavior.117  
Weary of the withering eye of Michigan v. Long, Justice Cappy 
emphasized the importance of rooting present and future decisions on 
Pennsylvania law to avoid review or reversal by the United States 
Supreme Court.118 Therefore, litigants were directed to brief—and 
courts directed to apply—at least these four factors: (1) the text of the 
 
 112. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894 (1991). 
 113. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). 
 114. Id. at 894. 
 115. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 892. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 893. 
 118. Id. at 895. 
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Pennsylvania constitutional provision; (2) that provision’s history, 
including Pennsylvania court decisions; (3) related case-law from other 
states; and (4) policy considerations, including “unique issues of state 
and local concern, and applicability with modern Pennsylvania 
jurisprudence.”119 
Applying that four-part framework, Edmunds began with a review of 
the Pennsylvania constitution’s text, which was similar to the Fourth 
Amendment’s language.120 Critically, textual proximity was not enough 
to bind the state’s highest court to the meaning preferred by the United 
States Supreme Court—even if the text is identical.121  
The historical inquiry, however, proved to be the crucial analysis. 
Pennsylvanians enjoyed state constitutional protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures more than ten years before the 
federal Constitution was adopted, and more than fifteen years before the 
Fourth Amendment was ratified.122 The framers of the federal 
Constitution looked to the Pennsylvania Constitution and other state 
constitutions in sourcing much of what became the federal Bill of 
Rights.123 Delaware provided a precursor to the federal guarantee 
against ex-post facto laws; North Carolina created rights for the accused, 
like trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination.124 Article 
1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution—guaranteeing citizens the 
“right to hold themselves, their houses, papers and possessions free from 
search and seizure” that occurs without a warrant—also preceded the 
federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.125 The primary historical 
purpose of a warrant was to protect against the noxious British practice 
of sweeping residences and businesses based on nothing more than 
general suspicion.126 A “strong notion of privacy” thus embodied Article 
1, Section 8.127 This privacy interest indwelt the state’s exclusionary 
rule.128 Justice Cappy contrasted the purposes of the Pennsylvania 
exclusionary rule with those of the federal exclusionary rule, 
acknowledging Leon’s position that the sole purpose of Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct.129 To 
the extent the federal exclusionary rule was ever purposed to safeguard 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 895-96 
 122. Id. at 896.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.   
 126. Id. at 897. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Id. 
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privacy, by 1973 the United States Supreme Court was vocalizing the 
central importance of deterring unlawful police conduct rather than 
redressing the injury to privacy.130  
Meanwhile, Pennsylvania jurisprudence had remained true to the 
original motivation undergirding the exclusionary rule: protecting 
privacy. The United States Supreme Court based the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule on the inability for evidence 
suppression to correct police misbehavior. Where there is no police 
misconduct, there is no need for deterrence. But since Pennsylvania’s 
exclusionary rule never rested completely on deterrence, its purpose 
applied even when officers acted in good faith on unconstitutional 
warrants. An officer’s good faith did not ameliorate the injury to 
privacy. By elevating privacy above deterrence, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court preserved the Pennsylvania Constitution’s exclusionary 
rule, as its purposes were still served by the suppression of evidence. By 
history’s light, therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the 
adoption of a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule “would 
virtually emasculate those clear safeguards which have been carefully 
developed under the Pennsylvania Constitution over the past 200 
years.”131 
Edmunds shows that even when a state’s constitutional text is 
practically identical to the federal text, a state’s history is gravid with 
meaningful differences from the parallel federal guarantee. The use of 
history can lead to drastically different results. 
4.  The Necessity of Principled State Constitutional Analysis 
An important criticism of Ohio Supreme Court’s cases expanding 
protection under the Ohio Constitution, beyond that which exists under 
the federal document, is the neglect of analysis.132 It is not controversial 
that Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force which may 
extend broader coverage over individual rights than the federal 
Constitution mandates.133 But absent an independent analysis of the state 
constitution’s text, history, or early understandings, it remains unclear 
“why Ohio constitutional law should differ from the federal law.”134 
That trifecta of considerations, and others, have been a boon to other 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 899. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also performed analysis on related case-law 
from other states and policy considerations.  
 132. See, e.g., State v. Mole, 149 Ohio St. 3d 215, 2016-Ohio-5124, 74 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 110 
(French, J., dissenting); State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 463, 2016-Ohio-8278, 83 N.E.3d 862 (Aalim I), ¶ 
33-34 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 133. Aalim I, 2016-Ohio-8278, ¶ 46. 
 134. Mole, 74 N.E.3d at 399, quoting State v. Brown, 39 N.E.3d 496, 503 (Ohio 2015). 
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state supreme courts interpreting their constitutions. In State v. Gunwall, 
the Washington Supreme Court set forth nonexclusive criteria relevant 
for determining when its state constitution should be interpreted to 
afford more significant rights than the federal Constitution.135 Sharing 
some factors in common with the Edmunds considerations, these 
included inquiries into the language, textual differences, constitutional 
history, preexisting state law, structural differences, and matters of state 
and local concern.136 Articulation of these interpretive principles was 
necessary in light of the growing concern with the expansion of state 
constitutional rights without an adequate analytical basis.137 Review of 
state decisions revealed that the resort to state constitutional law, instead 
of analogous federal provisions, was often supported by little more than 
the simple announcement that the decision had a state constitutional 
basis, with no further explanation.138 
The problem with these unsupported expansions of constitutional 
rights is that “they establish no principled basis for repudiating federal 
precedent and thus furnish little or no rational basis for counsel to 
predict the future course of state decisional law.”139 Constitutional 
principles do not “spring forth from the brow of an Olympian jurist” 
pondering mysteries, but from an “articulable, reasonable and reasoned” 
process.140 By announcing from the bench specific analytical 
touchstones, the Washington Supreme Court had both practical and 
jurisprudential goals. First, they intended to guide counsel in briefing 
their state constitutional claims.141 Second, they aimed to ensure that, if 
they did rely on state constitutional grounds, their decision would rest on 
“well founded legal reasons and not by merely substituting our notion of 
justice for that of duly elected legislative bodies or the United States 
Supreme Court.”142 Thus, a rational, replicable state constitutional 
hermeneutic promotes both the separation of powers and federalism.  
Justice Goodwin Liu of the California Supreme Court has pointed out 
the infirmities of the “criteria approach.”143 “Most significantly,” he 
says, “the approach treats federal precedent with a presumption of 
 
 135. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (1986).  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 811. 
 138. Id. at 811-12. 
 139. Id. at 812. 
 140. Id. (quoting Professor George R. Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I, 
Section 7, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 331, 347–48 (1985)). 
 141. Id. at 813. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights: A Reappraisal, 92 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1314 (2017). 
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correctness that has no sound basis in our federal system.”144 Especially 
when it comes to state constitutional issues in equal protection, due 
process, or search and seizure, courts may focus on federal law or adopt 
federal tests because the authority is abundant and developed.145 But 
Justice Liu advises that, rather than trusting in interpretative 
methodologies, “the crucial point is that state courts, as the ultimate 
arbiters of state law, have the prerogative and duty to interpret their state 
constitutions independently.”146 
Nevertheless, showing discipline in the analytical process has the 
virtue of predictability and replicability, enabling advocates to provide 
better guidance to their clients. A state court that does not address state 
constitutional claims with principled reasoning frustrates the already 
difficult task of advocacy. Next, we will address the refreshingly simple 
solution Ohio has employed in interpreting its constitution. 
III.  JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN OHIO 
A.  The Ohio Tradition 
1.  Arnold v. Cleveland 
The Ohio tradition of Judicial Federalism begins with Arnold v. 
Cleveland.147 The Ohio Supreme Court recently recognized that “Arnold 
stands as the court’s first clear embrace of Justice William J. Brennan’s 
watershed article.”148 Arnold addressed a local ordinance passed in 
Cleveland, banning the possession and sale of “assault weapons.”149 
Some exceptions applied, such as for police officers and members of the 
armed forces.150 Any assault weapons found to be in anyone else’s 
possession were seized.151  
Justice Andrew Douglas’s majority opinion acknowledged the 
controversy that firearms engendered across the country.152 He 
recognized the possibility that, if the same issue were debated at the 
time of the decision, the state constitution might read differently.153 But 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1315. 
 146. Id. 
 147. State v. Mole, 2016-Ohio-5124, ¶ 15. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 166 (Ohio 1993).  
 150. Id. at 164. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 169. 
 153. Id. 
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he set the contemporary dynamics aside, observing that “it is our charge 
to determine and not to disturb the clear protections provided by the 
drafters of our Constitution.”154 
The text of the Second Amendment uses the term “militia” instead of 
referring to individuals. Justice Douglas approached the Second 
Amendment as being largely concerned with militias.155 Section 4, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution, in contrast, deploys a broader 
guarantee: “The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and 
security.”156 Justice Douglas noted that, unlike the federal Constitution’s 
focus on the maintenance of a militia, Section 4, Article I affords 
Ohioans broader rights to firearms.157 The language, he found, was 
clear.158 The two semicolons suggest three independent clauses, 
suggesting that “the people of Ohio chose to go even further” than the 
Second Amendment.159 Therefore, the Ohio Constitution appeared to 
secure firearm rights to individuals for the defense of self and property, 
not limiting the right to militias.160  
Examining the legislative history, Justice Douglas observed that there 
was no recorded debate over the meaning of the right-to-bear-arms 
clause when the Ohio Constitution of 1802 was revised in 1851.161 This 
led to the conclusion that the right was uncontroversial at that time.162 
Historical analysis revealed that the right to self-defense has never been 
unlawful in this nation.163 Not only is the right to defend oneself one of 
our fundamental concepts of ordered liberty, but the right to possess a 
firearm has also been a symbol of freedom.164 But this liberty is not 
without boundaries; just as the framers intended for Ohioans to have the 
right to bear firearms, they also intended for reasonable lines to be 
 
 154. Id.  
 155. Justice Douglas did not have the aid of much textual analysis on the Second Amendment. 
District of Columbia v. Heller was decided fifteen years after Arnold, and there seemed to be precious 
little federal analysis of the Second Amendment at the time. Justices Antonin Scalia and John Paul 
Stevens would “volley” opposing textual arguments on the Second Amendment, Stevens arguing that 
the omission of firearm uses conventionally associated with individual ownership (such as hunting or 
self-defense) was “especially striking” by the affirmative inclusion of individual firearm uses in 
contemporary charters like the Declarations of Rights of Pennsylvania and Vermont. District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 642 (2008). But in 1993, the Ohio Supreme Court simply noted that 
Section 4, Article I of the Ohio Constitution went beyond the militia and secured “to every person a 
fundamental individual right to bear arms.” Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169. 
 156. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 157. Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d at 169. 
 164. Id. at 170. 
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drawn “when certain rights have foreseeable consequences of causing 
harm to others.”165 On this analysis, the Court determined that the Ohio 
Constitution confers an affirmative, but not absolute, fundamental right 
to bear arms.166 
Arnold did not go as far as the Supreme Courts of Washington or 
Pennsylvania in specifying an analytical methodology in addressing 
potentially divergent meanings within the state and federal constitutions. 
But the significance of Arnold’s textual and historical grounds for its 
result cannot be overstated. Anyone can read Arnold and appreciate why 
the Court decided the way it did. This is the kind of principled reasoning 
that promotes trust in the judiciary, enables advocates to more clearly 
advise their clients, and even gives the losing side the dignity of a well-
reasoned, if unfavorable, opinion. 
2. Humphrey v. Lane 
Justice Judith French has pointed to Humphrey v. Lane as a model of 
analysis that state courts would do well to imitate when reading stronger 
guarantees into the Ohio Constitution.167 Humphrey was a Native 
American who practiced Native American Spirituality and grew his hair 
out long in keeping with his faith.168 He was also an employee of a 
correctional facility which enforced a grooming policy that required 
men to keep their hair no further than their collar.169 
The trial court ruled in Humphrey’s favor, finding—by a state 
constitutional analysis—that the state could not infringe on a sincerely 
held religious belief without showing a compelling state interest and that 
the state furthered that interest through the least restrictive means 
possible.170 The appellate court reversed, holding that the lower court 
had used the wrong constitutional standard.171 The showing of a 
compelling state interest was unnecessary. Instead, the appellate court 
applied the recently minted Smith analysis, which the United States 
Supreme Court used to hold that generally applicable, religion-neutral 
laws, having the incidental effect of burdening religious practice, need 
not be justified by a compelling state interest.172 Since the grooming 
 
 165. Id. at 171. 
 166. Id. The Court went on to decide that the state could regulate firearm ownership based on its 
police power. 
 167. Video Recording: Interpreting State Constitutions, The Federalist Society, http://www.fed-
soc.org/multimedia/detail/interpreting-state-constitutions-event-audiovideo.  
 168. Humphrey v. Lane, 89 Ohio St.3d 62, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (2000). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1042. 
 171. Id. at 1042-43. 
 172. Id.; see also Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
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policy was generally applicable and neutral to religion, Humphrey lost 
on appeal.173 
Justice Paul Pfeifer began with a textualist inquiry, contrasting the 
First Amendment to Section 7, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and 
recognizing that Section 7 is “devoted entirely to the freedom of 
religion.”174 This textual observation recognized that where the federal 
Constitution includes free speech and a free press along with the free 
exercise of religion, the Ohio Constitution reserves an entire section for 
the free exercise of religion. The specific proscription against 
“interference with the rights of conscience” was broader than the federal 
Constitution’s mandate against laws prohibiting the free expression of 
religion.175 A policy that does not prohibit religious expression may 
nevertheless interfere with the rights of conscience. Thus, Ohio’s 
protection extends further than the federal protection.176 The federal 
Constitution brooks tangential effects on religion, but the Ohio 
Constitution shows less tolerance for such tangential effects if they 
interfere with the conscience.177  
What happened in Humphrey is analytically similar to Sterling v. 
Cupp, insofar as the state Supreme Court rejected a federal approach but 
found a state hook. In Sterling, the state hook was the Oregon 
Constitution’s prohibition against treating prisoners with unnecessary 
rigor. In Humphrey, the state hook was the Ohio Constitution’s 
prohibition against interference with the rights of conscience. Humphrey 
differs from Sterling because Article I, Section 7 had a federal corollary: 
the Free Expression Clause in the federal Constitution. But critically, the 
Ohio Supreme Court rejected the federal analysis on religion cases and 
used its own analysis. 
The Humphrey analysis primarily applies when the state 
constitutional language differs meaningfully from the federal 
constitutional text. Unlike Arnold, Humphrey involved no historical 
analysis, legislative or judicial. Nor did it look to other states’ decisions. 
But Humphrey is significant for its textual and structural analyses and its 
rejection of a federal test on the same constitutional right. Justice 
Pfeifer’s majority opinion offers principled analysis with respect to 
exegeting the disparate meanings within the religion guarantees. But if 
the textual and structural differences are less pronounced, Humphrey 
may be of limited service.  
 
(1990). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1043. 
 175. Id. at 1044 (emphasis added). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.  
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B.  Enlarged Equal Protection Rights and the Search for a Legal Theory 
One of Ohio’s significant Judicial Federalism cases is State v. 
Mole.178 Mole, a police officer, met a 14-year old minor boy on a dating 
app.179 The minor initiated contact with Mole, telling him he was 18 
years old.180 Mole was 35.181 Upon the minor’s invitation, early one 
morning Mole went the minor’s house, where they undressed and 
engaged in oral sex. The boy’s mother discovered them. It was then that 
the police officer learned that the boy was actually 14.182 
Mole was charged with sexual battery under R.C. 2907.03(A)(13), 
“which prohibits sexual conduct with a minor when the offender is more 
than two years older than the minor.”183 Mole argued before that, 
because the statute lacked a mens rea and because the statute failed “to 
connect a defendant’s occupational status with proscribed sexual 
activity,” the statute violated equal protection and due process.184 This 
argument failed at the trial level.185 Mole appealed, making the same 
equal protection and due process arguments struck down below.186 The 
Eight District held that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) “violated equal protection 
and was facially unconstitutional.”187  
Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor’s lead opinion identifies Arnold as 
the Ohio Supreme Court’s seminal enunciation of the Judicial 
Federalism, embracing the United States Supreme Court’s recurring 
reminders to “state courts that they are free to construe their state 
constitutions as providing different or even broader individual liberties 
than those provided under the federal constitution.”188 A state court is 
even free to reject the analysis employed by the United States Supreme 
Court in explicating corresponding constitutional guarantees.189 The lead 
opinion also acknowledged the Ohio Supreme Court’s inconsistent 
employ of the Judicial Federalism. In Robinette III, on remand from the 
United States Supreme Court, the Ohio Supreme Court tracked the 
federal analysis in construing Section 14, Article I of the Ohio 
 
 178. 149 Ohio St. 3d 215, 2016-Ohio-5124, 74 N.E.3d 368. 
 179. Id. at ¶ 3; Julia Bianco, Ohio Supreme Court Rules On Police Officer Accused of Having Sex 
with a Minor, Cleveland 19 News (July 29, 2016, 10:07 a.m.), 
http://www.cleveland19.com/story/32572134/matthew-mole-supreme-court. 
 180. Mole, at ¶ 3-4. 
 181. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at ¶ 5. 
 184. Id. at ¶ 6. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Mole, 2016-Ohio-5124, ¶ 9. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at ¶ 14 (quoting Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 42, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993)). 
 189. Id. 
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Constitution, which has “virtually identical” language to the Fourth 
Amendment.190 Unlike the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Ohio 
Supreme Court had tended to treat similar state constitutional language 
as having the same meaning as that with which the United States 
Supreme Court had imbued it.  
Shortly after Robinette III, members of the Ohio Supreme Court 
proclaimed that they would not “‘irreversibly tie [themselves]’ to an 
interpretation of the language of the Ohio Constitution just because it is 
consistent with language of the federal Constitution.”191 And following 
in that spirit, the Mole lead opinion invalidated R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) and 
thus 
 
reaffirm[ed] that this court, the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of 
the Ohio Constitution, can and will interpret our Constitution to 
afford greater rights to our citizens when we believe that such an 
interpretation is both prudent and not inconsistent with the intent of 
the framers. We also reaffirm that we are not confined by the 
federal courts’ interpretations of similar provisions in the federal 
Constitution any more than we are confined by other states’ high 
courts’ interpretations of similar provisions in their states’ 
constitutions.192 
 
The lead opinion recounts the same observation Justice Brennan had 
made, that “the individual-rights guarantees of the Bill of Rights were 
based on pre-existing state constitutional guarantees, not the other way 
around.”193 This historical fact is especially germane when United States 
Supreme Court rulings “dilute or underenforce” significant individual 
rights.194  
But when it came to the equal protection analysis—despite 
invocations of state court independence—the Mole plurality’s reasoning 
is indistinct from federal equal protection analysis. The lead opinion 
cites both federal and Ohio cases throughout its equal protection 
analysis, without identifying what, if anything, distinguishes them.195 
The closest Mole comes to an Arnold analysis was its review of the 
historical purposes behind amending the sexual-battery statute to include 
a provision on peace officers, in order to determine whether the 
 
 190. Id. at ¶ 17; State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 238, 685 N.E.2d 762, 765, 1197-Ohio-343 
(Robinette III). 
 191. Mole, 2016-Ohio-5124, at ¶ 17 (quoting Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St.3d 1, 10, 711 
N.E.2d 203 (1999)). 
 192. Id. at ¶ 21. 
 193. Id. at ¶ 22 (quoting State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 486 (Iowa 2014)). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at ¶ 27-28. 
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amendment had a rational basis.196 But after reading the Mole Court’s 
analysis of the government interest, it is clear that, if this is Ohio’s equal 
protection analysis, it is indistinct from the federal analysis.197 As 
Justice French’s dissent points out, the lead opinion’s “puzzling” 
analysis “does not articulate a new rule or standard for examining equal-
protection claims under the Ohio Constitution. Rather, the lead opinion 
recites a substantially similar rational-basis test under both the Ohio and 
federal Constitutions.”198  
Mole invoked constitutional independence, but did not create a new 
tier of scrutiny or a new concept of equal protection altogether; rather, it 
applied the same test used in the federal courts and cited several federal 
cases for support. And to the extent it reached a different result that a 
federal court would have reached, it is not clear what analytical 
considerations the lead opinion applied to the actual constitutional 
provisions. Thus, despite Mole’s purported enlargement of equal 
protection rights under the Ohio Constitution, it remains unclear what 
legal theory attorneys ought to raise in achieving the same success for 
their clients. 
C.  The Importance of Text and History—and Raising the Argument 
Some justices have helpfully signaled what they are looking for in 
state constitutional analysis, when they are tasked with addressing 
potential differences between the Ohio and federal constitutions. Justice 
Sharon Kennedy’s Mole dissent argues that the interpretation of Ohio’s 
constitutional provisions “should be guided exclusively by the language 
and history of the clause at issue.”199 As for the cases the Mole lead 
opinion relied on, most of them—unlike the lead opinion itself—
“engaged in an Arnold analysis by examining the text and history of the 
provision before taking the formidable step of declaring that a provision 
of the Ohio Constitution is more protective.”200 Justice French also took 
issue in Mole with the lack of an independent analysis of the language, 
history, and early understandings of Ohio’s equal protection 
guarantee.201 She voiced her frustration again in State v. Aalim I, in 
which the majority rendered broad constitutional protection—this time 
in the due process context—on largely precedential, decisional, and 
policy bases, but without Arnold’s more rigorous constitutional analysis. 
 
 196. Id. at ¶ 36-42. 
 197. Id. at ¶ 45-68. 
 198. Id. at ¶ 118 (French, J., dissenting). 
 199. Id. at ¶ 91 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 200. Id. at ¶ 82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 201. Id. at ¶ 117 (French, J., dissenting). 
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Justice French wrote that the majority had asserted “no basis—other 
than mere permissibility.”202 Justice Patrick DeWine, in Aalim II, noted 
that the recognition that the Ohio Constitution may provide greater 
protection does not give the court “unfettered license” to strike down 
legislation.203 “Rather, in construing our state Constitution, we are 
bound by the text of the document as understood in light of our history 
and traditions.”204 
Thus, in expressing the importance of textual and historical analyses, 
some members of the court are seeking to anchor cases on principles 
first articulated in Arnold. Arnold elevated the text and relevant history, 
including early understandings of the text, such that these considerations 
not only disposed of the legal question, but developed the law as well. 
Lack of an Arnold analysis, on the other hand, in the context of equal 
protection, will be especially problematic given precedent holding that 
the federal and Ohio equal protection clauses are to be “construed and 
analyzed identically.”205 Indeed, the issue of whether the Ohio equal 
protection clause is or is not coextensive with the federal equal 
protection clause seems to, in practice, depend on the case. Mole 
purported to apply a broader equal protection right under the Ohio 
Constitution than exists under the federal Constitution.206 Yet, a few 
months later, in Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio, 
the court noted that the two provisions are equivalent.207 But a week 
after Simpkins, Ohio’s equal protection clause was “coextensive with, or 
stronger than, that of the federal Constitution.”208  
Equal protection is just one area of law that would benefit from the 
intentional application of a state constitutional interpretive standards. An 
Arnold analysis of Article I, Section 2’s text and history—applied to the 
question of whether Ohio’s equal protection clause substantively differs 
from the federal equal protection clause—would at least have the virtue 
of being principled.209 Justice Patrick Fischer has indicated that both a 
 
 202. State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 463, 2016-Ohio-8278, 83 N.E.3d 862, ¶ 47 (Aalim I) 
(vacated). For a discussion of the Aalim cases, see Jesse Knowlden, State of Ohio v. Aalim: Due Process 
and Mandatory Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 251 (2018). 
 203. State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883, ¶ 45 (Aalim II) 
(DeWine, J., concurring). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 
60, 717 N.E.2d 286 (1999). 
 206. Mole at ¶ 23. 
 207. 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122, ¶ 46. These cases have not drawn 
majorities. Mole was a three-justice plurality with one justice concurring in the judgment. Simpkins was 
completely splintered, within two justices concurring in the opinion, one justice concurring in the result, 
two justices voting to dismiss the case as improvidently accepted, and two justices dissenting. 
 208. State v. Noling, 149 Ohio St.3d 327, 2016-Ohio-8252, 75 N.E.3d 141, ¶ 11. 
 209. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully explore the textual and historical differences of 
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textual comparison of the equal protection clauses and recent decisions 
“reject the conclusion that the two equal-protection provisions are 
‘functionally equivalent.’”210 Ohio’s equal protection language was 
formulated in 1851, seventeen years before the federal Constitution’s 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.211 The language of the two 
provisions also differs. The federal provision: no state shall “deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”212 The 
state provision: “political power is inherent in the people. Government is 
instituted for their equal protection and benefit.”213 Therefore, “it is 
possible that the two provisions set forth unique protections that are not 
necessarily contained in both provisions.”214  
Eventually, the Court will address whether it will treat the two 
provisions identically. But the Court has been clear that it is 
inappropriate to settle the issue when the litigants do not raise or brief 
it.215 In Simpkins, among other cases, the parties did not argue that 
Ohio’s equal protection clause provided greater protection than the 
federal version, and so the court did not consider the possible 
differences.216 Thus, it appears that the Ohio Supreme Court is 
committed to the dispute-resolution model of deciding cases, as opposed 
to the law-declaration model. That is, it will tend to limit itself to the 
arguments that the parties raise in their briefs and decide cases based on 
the record. And considering some of the opinions of Justices Kennedy, 
French, and DeWine, it appears that what will go a long way with the 
Ohio Supreme Court is clear analysis of the constitutional text and 
history, including early understandings of the text and a keen eye for 
precedent. To brief cases along these lines would not break new ground; 
it would simply be an application of Arnold. But the issues need to be 
raised in order for the Court to decide them. 
So it is that both attorneys and judges share in the responsibility to 
clarify an approach to Ohio’s constitutional law. On one hand, when 
attorneys fail to advance arguments that the Ohio Constitution differs 
 
the two equal protection clauses. 
 210. State v. Moore, 154 Ohio St.3d 94, 2018-Ohio-3237, 111 N.E.3d 1146, ¶ 40 (Fischer, J., 
concurring). 
 211. Id. at ¶ 39 (Fischer, J., concurring). 
 212. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 213. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 214. Moore, 2018-Ohio-3237, at ¶ 39 (Fischer, J., concurring). 
 215. Id. at ¶ 22 (“Most recently, we have considered the two guarantees to be ‘functionally 
equivalent’ and employed the same analysis under both provisions. No party has suggested that we do 
otherwise today. Thus, we agree with the opinion concurring in judgment only that this is not an 
appropriate case to take up the question whether the provisions should be given different treatment.”); 
see also id. at ¶ 40 (Fischer, J., concurring). 
 216. See, e.g., Simpkins at ¶ 46; Stolz v. J & B. Steel Erectors, Inc., 2018-Ohio-5088, ¶ 11; Moore 
at ¶ 22; Cleveland v. Oles, 152 Ohio St.3d 1, 2017-Ohio-5384, 92 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 32 fn. 1. 
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meaningfully from the federal Constitution, the Court is not likely to 
make the argument for them.217 On the other hand, when the Court has 
treated the issue, it has occasionally purported to expand protection 
under the Ohio Constitution, but without consistently explaining why 
the state constitutional guarantee actually affords that protection. It does 
not clarify matters when the Court teases that the Ohio Constitution’s 
promises are “coextensive with, or stronger than, that of the federal 
Constitution,”218 if it does not say how it is stronger or what analysis 
applies to make it stronger.  Principled guidance as to how the Ohio 
Constitution differs from the federal Constitution would invite and 
bolster litigants’ constitutional arguments and aid future court 
compositions in developing caselaw. But on a court that can change 
membership every couple election cycles, lack of guidance will lead to 
greater confusion, diminishing the ability of attorneys to shape their 
clients’ expectations about what to expect in state courts.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Federalism provides us with rights under two constitutions. Both are 
capable of offering unique protection. It is beneficial when the state 
constitution offers added protection, but without principled reasons for 
why it is different, courts will render inconsistent outcomes with ad hoc 
analysis. The Ohio Supreme Court’s advantage is that, as its 
membership changes, the analytical perspectives available to Ohio’s 
litigants change. But without a commitment to certain analytical 
principles, it has, on occasion, broken loose of its moorings in Arnold.  
Judge Sutton’s suggestion that fifty-one imperfect solutions are better 
than one imperfect (federal) solution is timely and well-taken.219 For any 
state court’s “imperfect solution”—that is, its own approach to 
constitutional interpretation—the virtue lies in an opportunity to 
articulate meaningful differences between the state and federal 
constitutions. A constitutional provision may be indeterminate, but 
inquiries into its text and history can yield well-reasoned decisions. 
Such decisionmaking promotes the judiciary’s public image as the 
branch of government that relies, not on a purse or a sword for 
justification, but on its fair and principled reasoning. But on the other 
hand, a state court’s vice—the condition keeping its solution 
imperfect—is the potential for analytical randomness. In Ohio, the non-
adherence to Arnold’s constitutional guidelines leads, at best, to 
 
 217. Moore at ¶ 22.  
 218. State v. Noling, 149 Ohio St.3d 327, 016-Ohio-8252, 75 N.E.3d 141, ¶ 11. 
 219. Sutton, State Constitutional Law, supra note 7, at 175-76; SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT 
SOLUTIONS, supra note 7. 
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uncertainty. Attorneys are hindered from counselling their clients based 
on reasonable expectations of how courts may apply the Ohio 
Constitution. At worst, it threatens to turn constitutional exegesis into 
eisegesis: reading meanings into the text that are not there. Deciding 
cases out of “judicial necessity”220 compromises the judiciary’s 
legitimacy in government and exchanges that great preservative of the 
public trust—force of legal reasoning221—for discrete resolutions of 
cases that seem to be the result of foregone conclusions. But by 
recommitting itself to a rational, reliable, and replicable hermeneutic—
and returning to the standards under Arnold—the Ohio Supreme Court 




 220. Mole, 2016-Ohio-5124, ¶ 91. 
 221. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review of Richard Posner, How Judge’s Think (2008), 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 859, 861 (2010). 
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